4 of telic activity. Without ends, and without being situated in a series of actions directed towards ends, actions are unintelligible and cannot be ascribed meaning, value, or an ethical standard.
One's history becomes a jumble of fragmented incidents with no coherence. Like Dennett, there is no pre-existing, substantial self in MacIntyre's view that unifies episodes of experience. Yet, differing from Dennett, the self becomes through the construction of a self-narrative. The 4 episodes of one's life are unified insofar as each event contributes to the resolution of the narrative. A narrative provides the temporally extended structure in which one can imagine a future resolution.
Schechtman (2011) calls MacIntyre's the "hermeneutical view," given that actions are interpreted through a narrative. She observes that the narrative must be explicit for it to ascribe value to action, as one must be conscious of ends to which their action is directed, that thereby grants their action ethical status. MacIntyre (1981) indeed states that one cannot experience the present without referring to a mental image of some future telos (215) (216) . Despite the explicit 5 and stable character of the narrative in MacIntyre's view, the literary format of the narrative seems less of an imperative than in Dennett's view. For instance, he uses the example of a cookbook to explain how each step of a recipe is only given meaning for their collective ends of the final meal. This, like Mackenzie's view, seems to stretch the definition of a narrative such that it overlaps with that of a more basic working temporal schema. However, he does also depict a narrative as a kind of quest and synomizes it at times with a story. Though I agree that one's life can take on this format, I will be arguing that one's lived experience is improved if the structure of their life more resembles (to themselves) a cookbook rather than a novel. 4 Hume similarly argues that the perceptions which constitute our personal identity, which are in a constant state of flux, can attain unification by being endowed with a common purpose, by being directed towards ends (1.4.6.11). 5 Discussed further in Section 4.
extended telic series of behavior, and receive an ethical standard determined by the ends to which they were directed. The strong view then presents a narrative which is more fixed and extended than Schechtman's NSCV, and therefore it has graver ethical implications.
In Schechtman's (2007) view, one's phenomenological experience of a narrative may also be more segmented (disunified), as one has the capacity for multiple intersecting narratives depending on what memories or projections are cued by present events. Narrative-construction,
to Schechtman, appears in general to be more organic, automatic, subconscious and evolving than those of the strong view (174-178). There is no "quest" in which one becomes embedded, as there is no fixed theme to which narrative segments must subscribe (173). However, one still interprets their actions through the context of a narrative, or more specifically to her view, a present moment is "conditioned" by the experienced past and anticipated future (162). This happily and even functionally. This position is what Strawson refers to as the Ethical Narrativity Thesis (ENT). Each theorist I've discussed would agree that without a narrative, one would feel a type of disorientation and fragmentation that would inhibit agential activity.
The critique that I will develop in the following sections of this paper, posits self-narratives as useful, if intermediary self-states. I reject Mackenzie's view which pathologizes non-narrative selves. I doubt that without a narrative one is lost amidst chaos of unintelligible sense data, though I recognize the need for a working temporal schema that may or may not present as a personalized autobiography. I similarly reject the view that actions need an extended telos to be intelligible or important. To this point I will discuss the different ways actions can have "ends," including actions that are thought to be exclusively autotelic. I will argue that it is beneficial to have proximal goals which are themselves 'means' to effective action, and which are malleable to changing circumstances. These are preferable to having fixed ends to which all of one's efforts are directed, ends which can easily become impossible or undesirable to realize.
Though I find Schechtman's (2007) middle view most reasonable, I will argue against her position that present experiences are always "conditioned" by the anticipated future and experienced past. I agree that this conditioning is an effect of a self-narrative, but I argue it can restrict one's capacity to understand present circumstances and act effectively, rationally and in such a way that generates positive affect for oneself and others. It is possible and preferable, I
will argue, that one develop the capacity to act more intuitively without reference to a self-narrative (even if that narrative is implicit and the reference is subconscious). Thereby, one utilizes their consolidated knowledge which they derive from decoding the contents of their narrative. To develop this criticism, I will describe the type of phenomena of which a narrative is composed, such that it is distinguished from a neutral temporal extension.
Narratives as Constituted by Charged Events
Criticisms raised against narrative views of the self are largely rooted in the observation that inhabiting an abstract temporal extension does not qualify as having a self-narrative. One can have a conceptual schema of the past and the future, without organizing the episodes inherent to that schema into a story. Zahavi (2007) has argued that having some sort of "time-consciousness" is a necessary feature of conscious awareness and is not exclusive to humans (191) (192) . Strawson (2004) , who denies having any sort of self-narrative, admits to having a lived past and an anticipated future that is represented internally to him. Yet, he denies having any major interest in either, nor does he locate himself (as he is presently) in his past or future frames. Narratives have to refer to some sort of personalized or diachronic life-story to 10 be non-trivial, something beyond the sort of temporal schema Strawson and Zahavi describe (Schectman 2013, 408-409) . Such an extended temporality must resemble a work of literature rather than an instruction manual. What kind of mental artifacts, then, must populate one's 11 temporal extension for it to be reshaped into a colorful, elaborate mosaic (such that one would be interested in it in the way that Strawson is not)?
In "Against Narrativity," Strawson (2004) argues that one who does not identity as diachronic and does not conceptualize their life as a narrative can sometimes harbor exceptional memories to which they connect diachronically. He states that such individuals "connect to 10 I will elaborate on Strawson's alternative 'episodic selfhood' in Section 5. 11 An instruction manual being having a linear, temporal order but one in which each line of information has a neutral relationship to the others. A manual is analogous to an episodic temporal extension because it is ancillary but disposable. It is not commodified or valued beyond its initial contribution as a precursor to action.
charged events in their pasts in such a way that they feel like those events happened to them," them referring to their selves as they are presently (the self who is indulging the memory)(430-431). These events are those to which Schechtman (2001) describes one as having "empathic access," as I discussed in the preceding section (Strawson 2004, 431) .
Strawson is describing a spectrum across which we relate to the first-person point of view or the third-person perspective of ourselves as agents, afforded to us by our memories of the past or our fantasies of the future. Certainly most individuals have images that could be placed at both ends of the spectrum. At the episodic end, there could be night of intoxication where one feels they were 'not acting like themselves,' or arbitrary memories of an adolescent phase (a fear of ghosts or an obsession with dinosaurs, for example) long since outgrown and less available to identification. At the diachronic end, there may be embarrassing memories that when revisited memories and projections comes to resemble a novel, complete with rising and falling action, twists and turns, climaxes, resolutions and afterwards.
Another way one might articulate the difference between episodic and diachronic memories is that the former feel inherited, almost like a collection of mental artifacts that can be examined and forgotten without special relevance to one's present self or to other temporally distant episodes. The latter are specific points in a narrative from which one can draw an unmistakable, causal connection to their present episode, such that they feel there is one consistent self moving across time from episode to episode. Here, one could argue that an empathic memory that perhaps represents a cause to their present effect, is actually a marker of one and the same episode that they are currently concluding or playing out -thereby determining their self as diachronic within that episode. Surely different memories or potentialities can become "charged" or given personal emphasis (while others can slip into insignificance) based on changing circumstances.
I think it is reasonable and useful to assert that self-narratives are constructed exclusively from these charged events to which one relates empathically and sentimentally, that may or may not constitute bookends of a demarcatable episode (432 The ENT claims that it is a good thing to experience and conceive of one's life as a narrative, and that this is required for wellbeing (Strawson 2004, 428; Schechtman 2011) . As discussed, proponents of the "strong view" argue that having an explicit, autobiographical account of one's life is necessary for their actions to have meaning, and for their episodes . While I will respond to these views in further detail throughout the remainder of this paper, it is important to note that such variations of the ENT encourage the preservation of self-narratives vividity and overall intensity belonging to the memory's expression. Spinoza elaborates on this theme in Book 5 of his Ethics, for example in Postulation 3: " An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. " 15 A criticism that may be raised against this position is that one loses something vital to their life-experience when they shed a rich, personalized narrative in favor of a neutral temporal metric. I will argue in Sections 4 and 5 that a life without the distraction of a narrative is actually more rewarding. It would be a topic for another paper to investigate the cultural contingency of narrativity. It seems consistent with a consumer culture that one would seek to commodify experience as memories, and construct a robust, important "self" with which they can compete in the marketplace.
and thereby discourage the reflective and analytic processes I discussed in the preceding paragraphs. In the following Section, I'll discuss how a persistent self-narrative could actually undermine one's sense of agency -a requirement for the good life.
Critiquing Narrativity: How a Subject Connects to Charged Events

A. Daydreams: Experiencing Our Images As If They Were Percepts
So far I have argued that narratives are composed of fixations, and that they are useful organizing devices but can be obstructive if allowed to persist. Strawson (2004) argues that even if episodics are more "located in the present" than diachronics (given that their present self does not relate to past or future episodes), they are not "more present in the present moment" (432).
While I do not think that as a rule diachronics are less attuned to percepts and sensations (products of their immediate experience as opposed to imaginative reproductions), I think that contents of a narrative encourage the type of mental activity that is antithetical to present awareness (contra Strawson). I attribute this characteristic to the vivid expression and emotive character of fixations. These factors enable empathic access to, and diachronic identification with the first person perspective of these fixations. We are thereby motivated to revisit them and relive the events they represent -either as they were or as we would have liked them to be.
Furthermore, their vivid character increases the likelihood that we will relate a present experience to these narrative chapters. In other words, we are primed to notice features of our present environment that relate to our fixations, at which point the associated fixation is brought to consciousness and our attention is bent back towards it (discussed further in 3.C). A fixation tempts revisitation -and it uses percepts to help us relocate it.
Important to note is that, although the fixation itself is something that manifests in the present, its content is always either of the past or is of some potentiality. In the case of mental imagery, focusing our attention on the content of the image (which is to say the outer objects within the interior space of the image), allows for an experience of a memory or fantasy as if it were real. This is opposed to a type of awareness wherein we would fix the image in time and space and extrapolate from it, such that its "frame" (the empty space surrounding an image) becomes perceptible to us (McGinn 2004, 59-60) . It would then be difficult to experience its content as percepts as opposed to imaginative representations. To become transfixed by the 16 content of a fixation would be the antithesis of what is referred to as being "present." While this experience allows us to exercise a type of proxy agency, it detracts from our capacity to act with any meaningful impact outside the insulated arena of our imagination and memory.
In his book Mindsight (2004), Colin McGinn refers to this immersive tendency in his "fictional immersion theory," likening it to the same psychic reorientation that takes place while watching a particularly transfixing film (103-106). However, with the exception of psychotic delusion, he doubts that we very easily "believe" in our images (dreams) while awake. He does allow for daydreaming -especially in adolescents who show early early signs of mental illnessas an avenue for so-called "dream belief." Yet, McGinn doesn't seem to consider the importance 16 I emphasize "images" here, but I think the same psychic behavior takes place with thoughts (or linguistic representation). Here I would contrast the active thinking or narrating of a sequence, as in the playing-out of a conversation or a speech (rather than visualizing an action sequence internally, as with imagery), from arresting a line of thought, extrapolating from it, and studying it. The latter is akin to where we would see the "frame" of the image, except there may be no words to see rather than an arrested thought to replay and analyze.
of existing attentionally within an image's spatial interiority (what Strawson calls a 'from the inside' perspective of a memory), versus extrapolating to perceive its frame (2004, 433) . One reason for this exclusion could be McGinn's insistence that images are non-occlusive, meaning our experience of images is not blocked or interrupted by percepts. This assumption holds that, except in spaces of sensory deprivation, images (including daydreams) will already be exposed as artificial by their juxtaposition with percepts. Yet, as Nigel J.T. Thomas (2014) writes, this excludes the advent of "inattentional blindness," as well as the practical modifications of maladaptive daydreams (intentionally blocking out sense-input with dream-conducive music, for instance). The occlusive possibility of images implies that abstracting from an image such that its frame is exposed, is a vital quality for distinguishing images from percepts. When one goes deep within the interiority of a fixation, and percepts are sufficiently benign (such as being in an empty room versus at a carnival), I think dream belief is more likely.
That we are capable of experiencing the content of thoughts as if they were percepts (as immediate, organic, exogenous and structured sense data) I think is further demonstrated by our physiological response to the content of fixations. If I remember seeing a rabid dog barking at me in my backyard when I was a child, my palms sweat and my heart races as if the dog in my memory were present in its material form. That we can enter into the first-person perspective of our fixations as though it were a surrogate, and experience the content of fixations as if it were exogenous, allows us to exercise a type of proxy agency. Here we create the conditions in which we act, which is something we cannot do outside our narratives. Indeed, this is what makes these daydreaming activities so seductive (Bigelsen 2016, 569-571; MacIntyre 1981, 213 ). Yet, it renders the consequences of our actions within the dream insignificant, as the challenges we face are artificial. Furthermore, daydreaming can become automatic, addictive and disruptive to our everyday experience, as with the aptly named condition maladaptive daydreaming (Bigelsen 2016, 564) .
I have argued that a persistent self-narrative encourages this type of psychic escapism and therefore diminishes our capacity to exercise genuine agency. Mindful reflection has shown to be an effective technique for reducing daydreaming tendencies (Harris 2014, 120) . Indeed, activity in the area of the brain referred to as the default mode network (DMN) decreases during mindful exercises (as well as during psychological states of "Flow," which I will discuss in Section 4) (120-121). The DMN is most active during periods of self-representation and "mind-wandering" (which I take as synonymous with daydreaming), activities described by Brewer et al. as simply thinking about the past and the future (2011, (20256) (20257) . Despite Schechtman and Mackenzie's position that self-narratives are largely implicit, the simultaneous activity in DMN during daydreaming and self-representation suggest that self-narratives are often explicit.
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Narratives provide an insulated psychological environment devoid of valid opportunities for one to take action. I argue that reducing a narrative expands one's attentional capacity for the present, increasing their ability to act decisively and effectively.
B. Imposing False Continuity
Another disruptive tendency of persistent narratives regards what may be a reflexive effort to replicate the content of daydreams in our lived experience, i.e., as part of some narrative 17 It's worth noting the narrative structure that is inherent to daydreams, as even MacIntyre (1981) addresses (211; Bigelsen et al. 2016) . As stated, self-representation is taking place during daydreaming or 'mind-wandering,' (assuming one visits the past or future such that they connect to it diachronically). This suggests that self-representation takes place in a narrative format, and the process is carried out first-personally, actively, internally and explicitly (which is to say, as a daydream). quest (as with the "strong view" as Schechtman describes it)(2007). The issue implicit to such quests are twofold: A. The self that arrives at an objective could be changed from the self whose actions were originally directed towards the objective; B. The objective itself may escape possability (the context an event happened in may be impossible to reproduce, for example). In both cases, the effort to realize the content of a fixation (a person, place, title, experience, etc.) is incompatible with the ontological fact of flux (Graham 2015; Williams 2000, 45) . Furthermore, the discontinuity of both experiencer and experience can be disguised by what Hume refers to as "custom . " David Hume's view on continuity casts doubt on the practicality of the extended telic quests, that are encouraged by (and supposedly made possible by) our self-narratives (MacIntyre, 1981) . Hume argued that perceptual objects which frequently co-occur will be perceived as one, our attention moving across them so quickly that individuation is imperceptible (1.4.3.5). We thereby establish an idea of the parts as a single object: O1. After sufficiently repeated 18 exposure to the conjoined parts, our attention will compulsively and habitually refer to O1 when presented with a resembling object (where only some of the components necessary to O1 are present). The transition between the present impression to the idea is so fast that we remain unconscious of the divide between the two (1.3.6.3, 1.4.6.7).
The effect of this process on our belief structure is similar to a film reel where two images (I'm referring to the percept and the idea) are transitioned between so quickly that they are seen as one. We, in effect, superimpose our image of O1 onto the present impression. We then filter the present object through O1 rather than recognizing its irregularities. McGinn (2004) (drawing from Wittgenstein) describes this process as "Imaginative Seeing," where incoming sense data "elicits a memory image, which thereupon attaches itself to the percept of the moment" (50). This process, he explains, results in a "joint product" of exogenous sense data and mental imagery (2004, p. 48-50) . McGinn cites instances where one sees a stranger S from afar and (often motivated by fear or desire) imposes a memory of acquaintance A* onto the basic structure of the stranger (this specific type of imaginative seeing is referred to as "seeing-as")(50). However, I think this process can be expanded to include when one does see A* , or the object from which their mental image of A* was originally derived. The object (a human being) would have certainly changed by degrees, but the 'attachment of the memory onto the percept of the moment' obfuscates that change. we subsume the present percept under that identity-concept. Rather than create a new idea from the percept, we simply subsume it under the already established idea. This creates the illusion that this idea accurately represents the object we are presented with. We come to regard our 20 A*-image as representative of a continuous, unified entity. Hume calls the strength of association between parts of a perceived object -such that we attentionally refer to A*-image from being presented with some of its parts -"custom." He calls the subsequent, compulsive attribution of identity to an object an act of "habit" (1.3.7.4, 1.3.8.14).
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Hume explains that one can reflect and discover the error the mind makes in attributing continuity to changing objects, yet it is impossible to override it for long. Rather than persisting in a chaotic flux of perceptions or constantly expanding our categories of objects given slight differentiation, we explain contradictions as "accidents" in either perception or material (1.4.3.7).
We then invent the notion of an underlying substance upon which these accidents happen. The underlying substance we invent for our fluctuating identity is actually the self (1.4.6.6). The objects of intentionality, with which a subject identifies, undergo change that is usually subtle enough to be explained away as mere modifications to an otherwise continuous assemblage (1.4.6.8,14). For example, John's abstract self-concept (or category) of being a father will continuously subsume the present conditions of his identity (his assemblage of memories, projections, ideas around having a family) established however long ago he had kids. Subtle irregularities, such as his children growing and requiring differing fatherly duties, will be overridden or integrated into his overarching self concept. The similar process of imaginative seeing takes place with his physical characteristics. John has an image in his mind of what he looks like and he can impose this image on the new person he meets in the mirror every morning (a new wrinkle, gray hair, etc.) In both cases, barring some serious disfigurement or the tragic loss of his children, John will continuously reproduce a fictitious continuity for himself.
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The notion of a narrative quest assumes that it is the same self who realizes the extended telic objective, and that the object of interest is realizable as one remembers or imagines it. Yet, the advent of imaginative seeing and category subsumption illustrate how we mistake resemblance for sameness out of habit. This tendency could undermine the practicality of long-term, telic endeavors which assume and require constancy. Referring to the earlier analogy, I may encounter "Bob" two decades after he committed his crime, at which point he could have had brain surgery on his amygdala and undergone a fundamental transformation in identity.
Yet, my memory of Bob as a violent offender could easily override any suggestion of this transformation. If the present "Bob" is similar enough to cue my memory, and my memory of
Bob is sufficiently vivid and emotively charged to be readily cued, my attention will be referred automatically from the present "Bob" to my established idea of Bob. As described above, I will thereby subsume this new person under a pre-existing idea rather than developing a new idea having taken present irregularities into account. Hume's view on continuity poses problems for narratives which, in this case, have the theme of retributive justice (the "strong view" of narrativity indeed tends to be thematic)(Schechtman 2007).
Likewise, I may go through a variety of telic activities to meet Anne, but fail to recognize that she has also undergone a radical change in personality. (Kornfield 1979, 44; Santorelli 1992, 280-281, 306-307) . If we examined our narrative segment of the festival (from the analogy Section 2), we could discover some of the virtues we value in others. We could then consolidate this information to develop a conception of our ideal person that stands independent of any specific fixation. Cultivating relationships along an informed set of criteria is more practical than the telic pursuits of narrativist romantics.
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Schechtman (2007) argues that the experienced past and anticipated future condition the present. To some extent this is unavoidable, as in having been hungry for hours makes a meal taste better. However, the extended temporality by which we measure our food intake and explain growing hunger and irritability is too simple to qualify as a narrative (as discussed in Section 2). Narratives are composed of charged events, and it is these events which condition the present in anyway that is non-trivial. The present is conditioned in that we are attracted to or repelled by present experiences based on their resemblance with the fixations of our narrative.
As stated, we are prone to make mistakes regarding the continuing identity of objects that inhabit our narrative, including the idea we have of our self that moves across a narrative. This error restricts our ability to perceive and understand the present and act effectively, rationally and 23 Psychiatrist Stephen Grosz offers a detailed illustration of the folly of romantic narratives in The Examined life (2013, (109) (110) (111) (112) (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) otherwise optimally. It furthermore carries a debt, whereby individuals must eventually 24 reconcile their narrative selves with their constantly changing environment. I will expand on 25 this point further in Section 4, which regards how we might act and perceive without a narrative.
C. Irrational Narrativity: Biases, Heuristics and Priming
Proponents of the ENT praise self-narratives for their capacity to enable teleological quests and deem them as necessary for making plans (as discussed in Section 1, and critiqued in the previous Section 3.B). The final criticism I would raise against this aspect of narrativity is that the types of goals which are constituted by charged events encourage irrational and often controlling behavior (as one's range of acceptable outcomes is restricted to the realization of fixed narrative episodes). Charged events carry an emotive gravity and have an empathic potential for us as we are now. If the fixation is positive, we strictly seek to replicate these moments in the present. If they are negative we avoid them. Therefore, one's perceptual range is limited in that they become primed to notice sense objects that are consistent with their narrative.
Having a broader range of perceptual awareness allows one to register myriad opportunities and possibilities. Diminished narrativity enables one to recall information in terms of relevancy as opposed to saliency, reducing the strength of various biases and heuristics on our decision making. Consider a professional runner that fails to prepare for a race given an overconfidence bias having one the previous race. Retaining the charged quality of the memory 24 The experience wherein individuals strive towards a much desired ends and then are mystified by their dissatisfaction (or unlasting satisfaction) with this ends, is common enough that I am not sure it warrants further examples. To give just one, the discorrelation between expected and experienced happiness in marriage (referred to as an 'error in affective forecasting,') could in part be explained by this issue with discontinuity at the heart of telic quests. (Kahneman, 2011, 398-399) . 25 It would be worthwhile to study empirically whether aging is more emotionally and psychologically challenging for diachronics vs episodics. My assumption would be diachronics have a more visceral sense of being pulled apart by time, whereas episodics are more "happy-go-lucky" (as Strawson puts it)(2004).
of winning, through reliving it as a daydream and positioning it in a broader narrative of success, discourages a thorough introspection of the event. The runner fails to recognize that ease in 26 winning the previous race is reducible to the race having taken place in his home town and to his close competitor having an injury. He therefore fails to practice sufficiently and loses the second race. Similarly, an athlete may compete beyond their prime, training obsessively and risking injury because of a desire to replicate positive episodes of their narrative independent of changing conditions. A narrative coded with episodes of celebrity would encourage an overconfidence bias as well as confirmation bias, as in listening to fans who encourage continued competition over trusted coaches and family members.
Narratives similarly increase the prevalence of heuristics. A fixation that is particularly idiosyncratic and fear-provoking but statistically insignificant, like an act of political terrorism in the United States, could provoke certain phobias associated with public places or garner support for legislative action that increases police presence and surveillance. Decoding fixations (through mediation or therapy), and understanding the etiological idiosyncrasies of an event, reduces (in this case) the strength of both availability and affect heuristics (Kahneman 2011, 138-140) .
Thus far I have offered a selection of criticisms that could be raised against the ENT.
Narrative theorists may argue that, despite these objections, a self-narrative is still our best option for living agentally. Without it, we would be trapped in a state of disorientation where our actions and lives are nonsensical to ourselves and others (Mackenzie & Poltera 2010 ). I will now shift my focus towards a positive account of non-narrative selves and explain how they qualify as agents, in response to this line of reasoning.
It is the topic of another paper to fully discuss variations on agency are autotelic, as the standard conception of agency holds action to be defined by explicit intentions towards an ends (Schlosser 2015) . For my purposes in this paper, I will assume a definition that is somewhat minimalistic, allowing for an agent to act intuitively and reflexively, guided perhaps by tacit norms or maxims rather than explicit intentions (Barandiaran et al., 2009) . Agency, as
Mackenzie (2010) defines it, is most basically the capacity to reflect, deliberate, choose, act and respond to reasons. I recognize agency as a necessity if one is to lead a quality existence, and as a qualification for autonomy and a personal sense of freedom, efficacy and empowerment.
Taking action that, if not explicitly intentional, is the product of sustained reflection, self-knowledge and reasoned deliberation, is itself inherently rewarding. Exercising agency in 28 this regard builds the confidence necessary for taking on further challenges, for taking risks with the assurance of one's capacity to rebound after failure. It is therefore requisite for personal development and for one to achieve autonomy from those who may otherwise exploit their lack of confidence. Agency is vital for one's well-being and for the capacity to live well, regardless of what an individual determines a good life to be. Such action needn't be willed towards a telos, however, as autotelic practices may show to be more rewarding than the alternative.
Mackenzie (2010) argues that a self-narrative is constructed as an initial exercise of agency, and agency then depends on the survival of the narrative (33-34). In contrast, I have offered instances when agency is undermined by narrativity. Self-narratives cause one to be more distracted, as when one escapes into their narratives through daydreaming or regularly defers attentionally to an 'image of a telos' or some other aspect of their narrative that is triggered by sense perception (MacIntyre 1981, 215-216) . There is a further tendency to superimpose aspects of one's narrative onto their sense perception through "imaginative seeing." Therefore, when a narrative decomposes (one having decoded and consolidated its informational content), one's attention is available to register a wider spectrum of incoming sense data, and for a longer duration. One whose attention is sustained upon the present has easier access to autotelic "flow states," the rewards from which are not contingent on a future outcome but are inherent to the activity. Flow states describe practices where one's attention is sustained within the activity they are undertaking. One thereby loses a sense of time (as in the temporal extension of a narrative) and a sense of self (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi 2009, 91) .
Defining characteristics of flow include increased positive affect, full employment of one's capabilities and the loss of reflective self-consciousness (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi 2009, 90 ). An example would be when a player is moving a soccer ball towards a goal and their attention is entirely invested in the moving of the ball with their foot. In this case, even the literal goal is proximal and contingent on the moment, as in it is malleable to changes happening actively and presently (making the winning-goal may quickly become impractical). The immediate sensation of kicking the ball is the sole recipient of one's attention. Perception (of passing opponents, the feeling of the ball against the clete, changes in the wind, etc.), recall of the relevant memory, adaptation of memory as action, perceived feedback, recalibration and further action -are together part of a seamless phenomenal exchange. The thought of one's self as an actor or thoughts of a fixed, extended telos do not enter into the sequence at all (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi 2009). 29 This description of flow states contradicts the claim made by MacIntyre (1981) , that there is no experience of the present without attentional reference to an abstract telos (215). The intervals in which one's attention is entirely absorbed in their activity may be brief, but they do happen and they can be expanded with effort. They are easier, or perhaps only possible if the action itself is initially autotelic. To achieve a state of flow, one cannot alternate their attention between the action at hand and an abstract objective on which the value of their present action depends. The long-term goal (if there is one), can change and vanish, as it is simply a means to temporal orientation or perhaps a source of initial motivation. The reward, though, is inherent to the activity, and therefore one's attention is more easily dedicated to that activity (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi 2009 ). I argue that the attentional subject could then qualify as a minimal, experiential self, yet one that is still capable of acting effectively from the relevant synthetic maxims (maxims produced from reflection upon a narrative, as discussed in Section 3) (Zahavi 2007 ).
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29 Daniel Kahneman's popularized "system 1" of automatic thought may be at work here, though I would argue one can contemplate actively and detachedly (system 2) and still be in a state similar to flow. Such thinking would contrast with daydreaming and not necessitate a self-narrative (Kahneman 2011, 105) . 30 I will elaborate on this view of the self, and provide a final comment on selfhood in Section 6.
The notion of autotelism deserves further unpacking, here, as it is relevant to the types of actions I feel are more likely to be undertaken by non-narrative selves. MacIntyre's claim that all intelligible actions have ends (or the standard conception of agency which holds all actions have explicit intent), seems more plausible if a "telos" could be reduced to those of the preceding examples: kicking a ball to move it, because one "feels like it" or because it brings them joy. To maximize one's capacity to act optimally (as in, to effectively bring about positive affect), I
argue that goals would best be malleable, proximal, largely subconscious and themselves a means to the process. Two friends may use a score sheet as a means to encourage competitive, engaging play, though the scores are insignificant. Likewise, someone could set an arbitrary destination for their walk, for orientation or motivation. The real objective, however, is the walk itself. This differs from having a fixed destination -for instance, a court appointment that one is late for, which (as a thought) occupies much of one's attention.
It is not that one must be completely indifferent towards an end result. In the example of the autotelic walk, it is certainly more likely that one chooses the arbitrary destination of getting ice cream rather than going to the morgue. However, the end result is not the purpose of the action, rather reward and motivation emerges from the action itself. Regarding what they call "emergent motivation," Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi (2009) A final point in support of autotelic activity for overall wellbeing: during telic action the capacity one has to appreciate and enjoy is more likely to be outsourced to an abstract telos. This enjoyment one enacts in a daydream or waits to experience when the telos has been realized.
When one commits their attention to their task completely, without great regard for ends, this capacity to appreciate can only be expended in the present. This, I argue, leads to more enjoyable activities, even those as commonplace as taking a walk or washing dishes. As I will describe below, I think autotelic activities are more easily undertaken with an episodic temporal orientation.
Episodic Selfhood
Theorists such as Mackenzie (2010) may argue that because narratives operate as "implicit organizing structures," a narrative is still at work during flow states. However, an important distinction (as I began discussing in Section 2) must be made between a subject's working temporal schema and an elaborate life-story. The capacity to orient oneself spatially and temporally, and to recognize the direction towards which they are going seems unavoidable and unspecific to humans (Zahavi 2007) . As Zahavi (2007) and others have argued, a basic temporal ordering is far too inclusive a concept of narrativity for it to transcend triviality (196; Schechtman 2013, 408-411) .
MacIntyre (1981) seems to overlook this distinction, regarding the order imposed by a cookbook as comparable to a narrative in that each step derives its meaning from its placement in a larger sequence (the recipe), and the context within which it exists (meal preparation)(209).
Similarly, Mackenzie (2010) presents an all-or-nothing view of narrativity, arguing that without it one is lodged in the "stagnant present" and forsaken of any filter to organize sensory data (32, (39) (40) an action by which one enters into a flow state is derived through the practice itself (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi 2009, 89) . If asked why one gardens, the answer may not be to please one's wife or to prepare for winter (to use MacIntyre's example) -though these may be potentialities inhabiting their temporal extension (1981, 206) . The answer could be, "I garden to garden," or "I garden because I like to." I see this as a satisfactory answer that renders the action both intelligible and valuable.
Fixations function as the peaks and valleys of one's otherwise one-dimensional temporal schema. This is to say, such a schema is shaped or distorted by these relatively intense highs and lows, into something that resembles a story. Memories can operate as markers to symbolize the 31 passage of time, but it is compact and charged memories and fantasies that command the landscape of one's temporal extension, determining from where one appears to be coming and to where they appear to be going. Caveats which I think could reasonably be placed on one's temporal schema, such that it does not qualify as a narrative, include that the schema should vanish when orientation is complete so that one can return attentionally to their practice.
Furthermore, long-term objectives should be malleable to the immediate feedback from the action, and their realization (publishing a book, finishing a painting) should be less important than the practice that lead to or followed from it. One should also be able to jettison a long-term objective if circumstances change, change which they would be more attuned to having been relieved of a distracting narrative. One should feel less resistance to changing long-term plans given that the value of a series of actions is not contingent on the realization of some potentiality -some fixed telos. Rather, the value is redeemed consistently through their performance.
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An episodic self, as Strawson (2004) To explain this further, I can remember my third-grade classroom objectively (from an impersonal third-person vantage point whereby the frame of the memory -and the empty space beyond it -is exposed) or I can live out the memory subjectively, experiencing it either from a first-person or from a third-person point of view (wherein I can view the class as a "fly-on-the-wall" within the classroom as opposed to abstracting from the memory altogether).
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The latter produces the sense that it was the twenty-six year old me in the memory, and not the eight year old me. I can do this likewise with fantasies or potentialities, imagining my one year present-day old nephew's high school graduation as if it was twenty-six year old me at the ceremony, not the hypothetical forty-three year old me. It may be impossible to actually 33 The functionality of this process was explained in Section 3.A experience the past as we experienced it when it was happening. We can experience it objectively or through the first personal lense, but always as the subject that we currently are.
The latter gives us the sense that there has been, and will be, one self persisting across time. Strawson (1999) argues that it is a metaphysical fact that selves do not last more than a few seconds (Schechtman 2007, 174) . My point of view is that any indulgence notions of self-continuity must ultimately reconcile with an ontology that is in a constant state of flux. On 34 the other hand, objective, depersonalized consideration of our past and our future encourages an episodic temporal disposition. Reflection upon salient memories and ideas diminishes their vividity, thereby diminishing the narrative structure which they would come to constitute, allowing one to become episodic. Without a collection of fixations with which we identify personally, we are less apt to revisit and relive the past through daydreams, or attempt to replicate parts of our narrative presently. Our attention is then available to focus on the present (on a wider spectrum of incoming sensory information), enabling the fullest employment of our capabilities -the apotheosis of agency. As I have argued previously, it is agency -the capacity to act effectively from reason and reflection, that is necessary to live well.
What is a 'self'?
In this paper, I have discussed various views of the self -that it is an abstractum, a theoretical byproduct of narrative overlap, metaphorically akin to a rubber-band ball (Dennett, 34 A possible criticism against this episodic orientation is that it negates social responsibility for future or past actions. However, one can be responsible for a future self even if it is not strictly speaking 'their' self, especially if their present actions largely determine who that self becomes. This is true in the case of raising children, for instance, where a parent still holds some responsibility if a child they neglected grows up to be antisocial and dangerous. One may, however, be resolved of responsibility for past actions if they can demonstrate relevant and sufficient change (as in, having brain surgery that removes a tumor which was causing one to act unusually violent). I would also note that one may be more emotionally responsive to long-term social issues (such as climate change) if they are attentionally available, as is made possible with an episodic temporal orientation. The lack of egocentrism which I suspect comes with diminished narrativity, I think could also enhance social responsibility.
awareness, one is capable of viewing their own narrative objectively. By objectively, I mean one does not inhabit their narrative first personally (or even third-personally, such that they occupy the interiority of an image as a "fly on the wall"). If the segment of narration being apprehended is purely linguistic (as in "I moved here from California to start a family," as opposed to an imagistic representation of this episode), it is fixed, abstracted from and revisited. The concepts and events being described are studied detachedly and equanimously. If emotions arise, those can also be abstracted from and examined equanimously. It is during this state that one can gain etiological insight about their life's history. These insights are achieved when one introspects a 35 fixation objectively, rather than inhabiting an episode's subjective lense (as discussed in Sections 2 and 5). Analogously, the person with the best understanding of the ongoings on an airport tarmac is not the pilot or any of the passengers, but the person watching from the air-traffic control tower.
My view is not that one should reside in the tower forever -indeed this is probably
impossible. Yet, taking an objective perspective of one's life, from the vantage of core-self, allows one to process and interpret one's narrative and the emotions which animate and illuminate it. One can then return to a more complex self-state wherein they inhabit a working temporal schema, but not to the extent where they habitually refer to their self as the protagonist of a narrative quest. This sort of narrative identification yields futility and frustration (as discussed in Section 3.B and 3.C).
Conclusion
In this paper I have critiqued narrative views of the self, arguing that self-narratives are 35 Such exercises are descriptive of meditation (Harris 2016; Kornfield 1979; Santorelli 1992; Hanh 2007) , as well as Stephen Kosslyn's (1994) empirical studies on introspection and image inspection (327-344).
largely composed of charged events to which we connect diachronically (Strawson 2004; Schechtman 2007) . The systematization of these fixations into a life story contrasts with the impersonal temporal schema of the episodic self. Yet, an episodic schema is perfectly sufficient for orientation and navigation. A narrative may be a useful intermediary organizing device for particularly emotive episodes, but an optimal self-experience is minimal. Having a persistent self-narrative prevents us from being attentionally present. This results from our tendency to relive the episodes of our life story, and to pursue the realization our episodes via extended teleological endeavors. I have argued that the good life is not achieved through narrativity, but through informed, autotelic action.
